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ABSTRACT
Network operators are reluctant to share traffic data due to
security and privacy concerns. Consequently, there is a lack
of publicly available traces for validating and generalizing
the latest results in network and security research. Anony-
mization is a possible solution in this context; however, it is
unclear how the sanitization of data preserves characteris-
tics important for traffic analysis. In addition, the privacy-
preserving property of state-of-the-art IP address anonymi-
zation techniques has come into question by recent attacks
that successfully identified a large number of hosts in ano-
nymized traces.
In this paper, we examine the tradeoff between data utility
for anomaly detection and the risk of host identification for
IP address truncation. Specifically, we analyze three weeks
of unsampled and non-anonymized network traces from a
medium-sized backbone network to assess data utility. The
risk of de-anonymizing individual IP addresses is formally
evaluated, using a metric based on conditional entropy.
Our results indicate that truncation effectively prevents
host identification but degrades the utility of data for
anomaly detection. However, the degree of degradation de-
pends on the metric used and whether network-internal or
external addresses are considered. Entropy metrics are more
resistant to truncation than unique counts and the detec-
tion quality of anomalies degrades much faster in internal
addresses than in external addresses. In particular, the use-
fulness of internal address counts is lost even for truncation
of only 4 bits whereas utility of external address entropy is
virtually unchanged even for truncation of 20 bits.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.3 [Computer-Communication Networks]: Network
Operations
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Measurement, Performance, Security
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies
bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific
permission and/or a fee.
NDA’08, October 31, 2008, Fairfax, Virginia, USA.
Copyright 2008 ACM 978-1-60558-301-3/08/10 ...$5.00.
Keywords
Privacy, Anonymization, Anomaly Detection
1. INTRODUCTION
The sharing of network traffic traces is a crucial prerequi-
site for fostering progress in network and security research.
Unfortunately, even when data export is restricted to packet
headers, as it is the case with Cisco NetFlow, a certain
amount of personal information may still be extracted and
exploited to profile user behavior. This threat to user pri-
vacy has already been recognized by data protection legisla-
tion in both Europe [8, 9] and the United States [16]. As a
result, multiple anonymization tools that aim to prevent the
leakage of privacy information have been developed, such as
FLAIM [20], TCPdpriv [15], and CryptoPAn [10]. Despite
the widespread application of these tools, the effect of the
implemented techniques is not yet understood in-depth.
For researchers with access to non-anonymized data sets,
this is not an issue. Unfortunately, only few research insti-
tutes have such traffic traces available and the large majority
works with publicly available, but already anonymized data
sets. For instance, the widely-used traces from Abilene ap-
ply truncation of 11 bits. Hence, studies on the impact of
anonymization methods are needed. Anonymization tech-
niques need to be evaluated along two dimensions: (i) the
residual risk involved in publishing data and (ii) the utility
of anonymized data for various applications.
As for the study of risk, recent work has shown that many
state-of-the-art techniques for IP address anonymization are
not as secure as expected [6, 11, 4, 18]. The reason for
this weakness is rooted in the fact that random permuta-
tion and (partial) prefix-preserving permutation [10, 17] are
reversible. Permutations are vulnerable to fingerprinting
attacks and behavioral analysis, i.e., individual hosts can
be profiled and mapped back to original entities. Trunca-
tion of IP addresses, on the other hand, involves a signifi-
cant amount of information loss that thwarts host profiling.
We argue that permutation-based anonymization of IP ad-
dresses is not sufficient and propose the use of truncation,
which offers a stronger level of privacy by aggregating indi-
vidual hosts. We formally evaluate the risk of host identi-
fication in truncated flow traces and show that truncation
provides stronger privacy guarantees than other anonymiza-
tion techniques such as permutations.
The remaining question is how truncation preserves data
utility for different applications. Being an important appli-
cation of flow traces, we evaluate trace utility with regard
to network anomaly detection, in this paper represented by
a Kalman filter approach. The specific problem we are in-
vestigating has not yet been addressed in the literature.
Our contributions are the following: (i) we quantify the
utility of truncated data for backbone anomaly detection
with the help of a three-week long data set from a medium-
size ISP and an anomaly detector based on a Kalman filter;
(ii) we derive a metric for the risk of host de-anonymization
when truncation is applied; and (iii) based on these results,
we present a quantitatively evaluated risk-utility map for
truncation.
In Section 2 we briefly discuss related work for risk and
utility assessment of anonymization techniques. Section 3
covers the applied methodology. We then argue that the
effect of truncation is different for internal and external ad-
dresses, due to an observed asymmetry in prefix structure
(Section 4). Utility and risk for truncation are quantified
in Sections 5 and 6. The findings are consolidated in Sec-
tion 7, where a quantitative risk-utility map for truncation
is presented.
Among other results, we found that the entropy of ad-
dresses is more resistant to truncation than unique address
counts. Furthermore, our results show a fundamental asym-
metry between internal and external address distributions.
With increasing number of truncated bits, both, utility and
disclosure risk drop faster for internal than for external ad-
dresses. Finally, we discuss our findings and conclude the
paper in section 8.
2. RELATED WORK
A graphical representation of the risk-utility tradeoff for
anonymization techniques was introduced by Duncan et
al. [7] with the R-U map, which plots the risk versus utility
for anonymization techniques. We will use the R-U map to
summarize our findings from Sections 5 and 6.
As stated above, recent attacks have revealed that pri-
vacy of individual hosts is in danger when (partial) prefix-
preserving permutation is used. For instance, Ribeiro et
al. [18] attack prefix-preserving permutation by fingerprint-
ing hosts based on their active ports and exploiting the struc-
ture of the prefix tree. Koukis et al. [11] recognize anonymi-
zed webservers by means of characteristic object sizes and
systematic port-scanning. Brekne et al. [4] analyze the fre-
quency of objects and Coull et al. [6] construct behavioral
profiles using dominant state analysis.
All of these attacks have in common the identification of
hosts by means of unique characteristics or behavior. These
kind of attacks is always feasible when a host-preserving
anonymization scheme is used. Hence, even stronger tech-
niques that do not preserve prefixes, such as renumbering
of hosts with integer numbers, are vulnerable. In worst
case, an attacker capable of injecting traffic into the net-
work prior to anonymization could send individual finger-
print packets to target hosts and later identify them in the
anonymized traces. Therefore, we advocate truncation as
a remedy against host identification, as it aggregates indi-
vidual hosts along with their characteristics. This effect of
truncation is similar to k-anonymity [23]. A data set is k-
anonymous if individual records are not distinguishable from
k−1 other records by a set of so-called quasi-identifiers that
can be linked to external information.
While the success of each of these attacks could be used
as a metric for assessing host identification risk, some more
general metrics have been proposed. Coull et al. [5] de-
fine a similarity metric for datasets based on information
entropy and mutual information. This allows the authors
to capture the statistical indistinguishability of objects in
the traces and identify high risk objects. However, their
analysis is quadratic in the number of objects and has been
evaluated only on a small dataset (<30k flows). Bezzi [1]
proposed metrics based on conditional entropy that mea-
sure the uncertainty about original records, given the ano-
nymized traces. Based on Bezzi’s metrics, [12] evaluated
different anonymization policies, again on a small dataset
with roughly 60k flows. Due to the large amount of flows
in our dataset (see Section 3.1) and the computational com-
plexity of these metrics, we derive a similar metric based on
conditional entropy that formally estimates the host iden-
tification risk for truncation (see Section 6). The metric is
then parameterized with our data set.
With respect to utility, Soule et al. [21] study anomaly de-
tection in NetFlow data from two backbone networks (Abi-
lene and GEANT) that apply different sampling and anony-
mization schemes. Although anonymization is not the focus
of their study, they assume that it has an impact on their
results. This is exactly where our work concentrates on.
We study the effect of anonymization on raw data that has
not been falsified by prior anonymization or sampling. The
problem of data loss due to anonymization was also identi-
fied in [27], where the authors give qualitative recommenda-
tions for anonymization of NetFlow logs when security ser-
vices are outsourced. Yurcik et al. [26] analyze single-field
anonymization tradeoffs with regard to intrusion detection.
Unfortunately, their dataset contains already anonymized
IP addresses, hence the impact of IP address anonymization
techniques on utility is not studied. On the contrary, [3]
and [14] studied the utility of sampled traffic traces without
addressing the effect of anonymization.
We assess the utility of anonymized data by evaluating
the sensitivity of a specific detector. Our detector models
normal traffic with a Kalman filter (as proposed by [22]),
and applies a threshold to the residual difference between
the measured and the predicted signal. We expect, however,
similar results for other popular detectors (e.g., [13, 25]) that
apply the same metrics for detection.
3. METHODOLOGY
In this section, we describe our methodology for studying
the risk and utility of flow data anonymized with truncation.
We introduce the data set used in this study, and describe
the methodology for quantifying the risk and utility for dif-
ferent truncation parameters.
3.1 Measurement Data
The data used in this study was captured from the four
border routers of the Swiss Academic and Research Network
(SWITCH, AS 559) [24], a medium-sized backbone opera-
tor, connecting several universities and research labs (e.g.,
IBM, CERN) to the Internet. The SWITCH IP address
range contains about 2.2 million IP addresses and the traffic
volume varies between 60 and 140 million NetFlow records
per hour under normal conditions. We analyzed a three-
week period (from August 19th to September 10th 2007).
This data set contains a variety of anomalies with diverse
characteristics. In total, 43.2 billion flows covering a volume
of 713 Terabytes of traffic were analyzed. In contrast to
previous work, this study is based on un-sampled and non-
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Figure 1: Time series and corresponding residual
signal from the Kalman filter.
anonymized flow data. Such datasets are difficult to obtain
but necessary when bias and distortion in the results are to
be minimized.
3.2 Risk Quantification
For a sound quantification of privacy risk, one must spec-
ify the goal and the capabilities of the attacker as well as a
metric that is suitable to comprise success of the attack.
In our study, the goal of the attacker is host identifica-
tion. That means, for a given anonymized IP address the
attacker tries to recover the original address. We assume
that the attacker knows the set of IP addresses in the origi-
nal trace. That is, the attacker tries to map the IP addresses
from the anonymized traces to the list of known original ad-
dresses. Such a list could, at least partially, be compiled
by scanning of active hosts and using public information
about well-known sites. These assumptions are not quite as
strong but similar to those of Coull et al. [5] in the sense
that they represent a worst case scenario. In their model,
the attacker has exact information about the objects (e.g.
hosts, servers or users) and knows the distributions in origi-
nal data. Similar to Coull et al., the focus of our analysis lies
on the statistical ability to distinguish objects rather than
the practical details of performing an attack.
For estimation of the de-anonymization risk we apply a
metric based on conditional entropy along with [1, 12]. We
formally compute the average probability for the attacker
to correctly guess the original address from an anonymized
address.
3.3 Utility Quantification
In this Section we describe the methods applied to assess
data utility. In particular we describe the studied anonymi-
zation technique (truncation), the metrics and procedures
used for anomaly detection, and the classification of events
in our data.
Utility is very sensitive to the application that anonymized
data is used for. Hence, utility always needs to be quantified
with a specific application scenario in mind. The application
scenario we are interested in here is the detection of denial
of service attacks and network scans in flow data. Anomaly
detection literature has proposed a variety of metrics, e.g.,
flow, byte, port, address counts, or Shannon entropy, that
can be used for the detection of network anomalies (e.g.
[25]). Inspection of our data shows that address counts and
entropy are affected by (D)DoS attacks and scans in the
following way:
(D)DoS: Denial of Service attacks cause a concentration of
the flows on one or few target IP addresses and hence
a drop in the destination IP address entropy. If the
attack is distributed or source addresses are spoofed,
we additionally see a spike in the source IP address
counts and entropy.
Scan: Scans provoke an increase in the destination IP
address counts and entropy. If scan sources are dis-
tributed, we also see an increase in the source IP counts
and entropy.
Truncation of x bits (e.g., 8 bits) replaces each IP ad-
dress in a flow trace with its respective /(32− x) (e.g., /24)
address prefix. Hence, truncation mainly impacts metrics
based on IP addresses, such as the unique address count,
or the distribution of flows per address as captured by the
Shannon entropy. Specifically, the number of unique IP ad-
dress counts is replaced by the number of unique /(32 − x)
networks in the trace; the distribution of flows per IP address
is replaced by the distribution of flows per /(32−x) network.
The question to be addressed here is how this replacement
affects anomaly detection results for the respective metrics.
To study this question, we have manually labeled the
three-week long flow trace described above. For establishing
the ground truth, we computed and visually scanned a va-
riety of volume and entropy metrics commonly applied for
anomaly detection, namely flow, packet, and byte counts
as well as source/destination address/port counts and en-
tropy. Accordingly, we classified each 15-minutes interval in
the three weeks as either normal or anomalous. In a second
step, we identified those of the anomalous intervals that have
a clear scan or (D)DoS signature. We used only those inter-
vals classified as normal (= 1305 intervals) or scan/(D)DoS
event (= 571 intervals) for the evaluation.
To assess the utility of data anonymized with truncation
for anomaly detection, we compare the detection rates for
IP-based metrics computed on the original traces with those
computed on anonymized traces. Specifically, we compare
the results for six different truncation rates: no truncation,
truncation of 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 bits. Hence, the metrics we
compare are IP address counts, /28, /24, /20, /16 and /12
network counts, as well as entropy per IP addresses, /28,
/24, /20, /16 and /12 networks. Moreover, we distinguish
internal and external addresses since we are interested to see
whether and how the asymmetry of internal and external
prefixes (described in section 4) affects the utility.
As detector we apply a Kalman filter (see e.g. [22]) to
each metric. The Kalman filter models normal traffic as
a “measurement-corrected” AR(1) process plus zero-mean
Gaussian noise. The difference between this model and the
actual measured time series, the so-called residual, is used
for detection (see Fig. 1 for an illustration). An alarm is
raised by the detector if the residual excesses some thresh-
old. To assess the detector performance for each metric and
truncation rate, we plot the false positive vs. true positive
rates for different thresholds, known as ROC curves. To ob-
tain a single utility value per metric and truncation rate, we
compute the Area Under the ROC Curve (AUC) [2].
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Figure 2: Prefix structure of internal/external hosts
for one hour of regular traffic (x: truncated bits).
4. ASYMMETRY OF INTERNAL AND EX-
TERNAL PREFIXES
The impact of anonymization highly depends on the un-
derlying traffic characteristics. For the SWITCH network,
we have observed that the distribution of internal and exter-
nal hosts is quite different. Pang et al. [17] make the same
distinction by applying a weaker anonymization policy for
external than for internal addresses. In their case, the per-
ceived risk is lower for external addresses. In this Section we
highlight the distributional differences in our network and
explain why we think they give rise to a significant asym-
metry between the internal and external domain.
As mentioned before, truncation causes a coarse-graining
of network entities. Individual hosts are no longer distin-
guishable because truncation of x bits aggregates all IP ad-
dresses in the corresponding /(32-x) subnet. As a conse-
quence, metrics based on IP addresses loose a significant
amount of detail. Rather than counting IP addresses or
computing the entropy of hosts, metrics are computed on
prefixes of length 32-x. Figure 2 illustrates this effect with
the example of unique address count. As more and more
bits are truncated, the number of distinguishable prefixes is
reduced. Prefixes are differentiated with respect to direc-
tion (source or destination) and address domain (internal or
external). We differentiate the direction because this sep-
arates targets of scans that are mainly visible in internal
destination addresses. The distinction between internal and
external is done using the assigned prefix table of the AS.
For instance, if a host within the SWITCH network sends a
packet to google.com, the host will appear in the internal
source addresses and google.com in external destinations.
When google.com replies to the request it is added to exter-
nal sources and the host to internal destinations. Note that a
distinction between internal and external address space only
makes sense in a stub AS (e.g. SWITCH) or an organiza-
tion network. For transit ASes (e.g. Abilene), all addresses
should be considered external.
Surprisingly, two groups of prefixes with different behav-
ior can be clearly identified in Fig. 2: those that repre-
sent external addresses and those of SWITCH-internal ad-
dresses. For increasing x, the number of external prefixes
remains roughly constant up to turning point (a) around
prefix length /24, and decreases exponentially for x > 8
bits. In contrast, the number of internal prefixes falls expo-
nentially with x and levels off at turning point (b) around
16 bits. The plateau before turning point (a) indicates that
only few hosts in each external /24 subnet exchange traffic
with the observed network. Since a corresponding plateau is
missing for internal prefixes, we conclude that we see traffic
from almost all hosts of internal /24 subnets. Naturally, the
total number of internal /24 subnets is limited by the pre-
fix table of SWITCH. The plateau after turning point (b)
is due to the fact that the prefix table is dominated by 30
to 40 complete /16 subnets. Thus, the number of internal
prefixes for x > 16 cannot grow exponentially with prefix
length as for external prefixes.
This observation leads to the question whether the
truncation-induced reduction of risk and utility is asymmet-
ric with respect to internal and external addresses. That is,
we hypothesize that anomalies detectable in external address
distributions are more resistant to truncation than those of
internal distributions because the characteristics of external
/32 prefixes are less impaired by truncation of the first 8
bits (see Fig. 2). On the risk side, internal addresses aggre-
gate faster with increasing x than external addresses, which
makes it harder to identify individual internal hosts.
Note that the difference between internal source and des-
tination prefixes is due to scanning activities that activate
virtually all internal addresses (about 2 million) in the des-
tination set. That is, even nonexistent hosts appear in the
destination set, simply because a packet was sent to them.
Thus, by multiplying the set of potential addresses, scanning
could, at first glance, complicate the task of an attacker try-
ing to identify a specific host in the data set. However, we
believe it is quite simple to detect scanning activity and fo-
cus on the real hosts. Therefore, we only consider internal
source addresses, representing the active hosts of the net-
work.
Along with the general assessment of risk and utility in
presence of truncation, we try to confirm or refute these
asymmetry assumptions in the remainder of this paper.
5. UTILITY OF TRUNCATED DATA
In this section, we present our results regarding the util-
ity of truncated data for the detection of scans and denial
of service attacks in flow data. In Fig. 3, we show the ROC
curves for two metrics, address counts (upper plots), and
address entropy (lower plots), for different truncation rates.
Moreover, we distinguish metrics computed on internal ad-
dresses (left-hand side) and external addresses (right-hand
side). A very accurate detector has a ROC curve that closely
follows the left-hand border (low false positive rate) and the
top border (high true positive rate) of the ROC space; the
closer the ROC curve comes to the diagonal of the ROC
space the worse becomes the detectors’ accuracy. In Fig. 4,
we additionally plot the AUC value for each ROC curve for
different truncation rates. The area under the curve (AUC)
is a single-value summary of a ROC curve. An AUC value
between 0.9 and 1 means excellent detection capabilities,
while an AUC value of 0.5 means the detector is useless, i.e.
not better than random guessing.
5.1 Counts vs. Entropy
When comparing the detection results for count and en-
tropy metrics (upper vs. lower plots in Fig. 3 and dash-
dotted vs. solid lines in Fig. 4) in truncated data, we see a
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Figure 3: ROC curves for address counts (upper
two plots) and address entropy (lower two plots),
for internal (left) and external (right) addresses.
clear difference between the two. While the detection rate
on non-anonymized data is high, likewise for counts and en-
tropy, the picture changes completely when truncation is
used. The detector performance for counts decreases signif-
icantly with higher truncation rates. Even for a truncation
rate as low as 4 bits, the detection (or true positive) rate for
a given false positive rate of 0.05 is reduced by more than
50%, which makes detection practically impossible. For en-
tropy metrics, on the other hand, the performance decreases
much slower. Both, internal and external address entropy,
perform well even when the data is anonymized with trun-
cation of as much as 8 bits.
How can we explain this remarkable difference? We have
two possible explanations for the bad performance of counts:
First, it is possible that the attacks are not well distributed
with respect to network prefixes, e.g. /16 networks. A sec-
ond reason might be that the background noise is higher for
prefix counts than for IP address counts. Further analysis is
required to check on these assumptions. The superior per-
formance of entropy metrics on truncated data suggests that
the distribution of flows per network prefix is similar to the
distribution per IP address. The effect of truncation on en-
tropy metrics is that the flows to all IP addresses within the
same prefix are merged into a single value. Hence, the distri-
bution within the prefix range gets lost, but the distribution
of flows over all prefix ranges is retained.
We conclude from this observation that the increased com-
plexity for computing entropy metrics, compared to simple
address counts, is worth the effort, when working with ano-
nymized data. Entropy has already been shown to work
reasonably well on the Abilene traces that are anonymized
with truncation of 11 bits [13, 19].
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5.2 Internal vs. External Prefixes
We have introduced the prefix asymmetry observed in
stub networks, like the SWITCH network we are studying,
in section 4. We have shown that almost all available in-
ternal prefixes appear in normal traffic (exponential decay
of unique prefixes with decreasing prefix length), while only
a small part of all external prefixes is present in normal
traffic (almost the same number of IP addresses and /24
networks). When comparing the plots for internal and ex-
ternal addresses for count and entropy metrics, we find that
count metrics (upper row) do not show a significant differ-
ence for internal and external addresses, while for entropy
metrics (lower row) there is a clear difference between the
two. Entropy computed on external addresses is not affected
at all, even when as much as 20 bits are truncated from the
IP addresses.1 For internal addresses performance decreases
significantly when more than 12 bits are truncated.
We believe that for count metrics the impact of truncation
dominates any impact that the difference in internal and
external addresses could have. For entropy metrics, on the
other hand, the distribution is preserved much better for
external addresses with increasing truncation rates. This
can be explained with the fact that the used external address
space is much sparser than the internal one, and thus less IP
addresses are merged into a single value through truncation,
and the distribution is less affected.
Therefore, when using entropy as metric, the truncation
rate can be up to 20 bits for external addresses without af-
fecting the utility of the data for the detection of (D)DoS
attacks and network scans, while for internal addresses trun-
cation of 8 bits is acceptable. These specific results are, how-
ever, only valid for our data set, and need to be validated
with other sources in the future. In particular, tolerable
truncation of internal addresses is highly dependent on the
network size.
6. RISK OF HOST IDENTIFICATION
We estimate the risk of host identification by applying a
metric based on conditional entropy along with [1, 12]. Let
R be the set of anonymized addresses and S the set of all
original addresses. We are now interested in the probability
that, given an anonymized address r ∈ R, the correct origi-
nal address s ∈ S is recovered. The conditional probability
distribution P (S|r) assigns to each s a probability P (s|r) to
1The 20 bits rate is only shown for external entropy in Fig. 3.
Original (S) Truncated (R) P (S|r) H(S|r)
129.132.80.15 129.132.80.0 1
3
, 1
3
, 0, 0, 1
3
, 0 1.6
129.132.80.77 129.132.80.0 1
3
, 1
3
, 0, 0, 1
3
, 0 1.6
129.132.115.5 129.132.115.0 0, 0, 1
2
, 0, 0, 1
2
1.0
152.88.3.90 152.88.3.0 0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0 0.0
129.132.80.144 129.132.80.0 1
3
, 1
3
, 0, 0, 1
3
, 0 1.6
129.132.115.90 129.132.115.0 0, 0, 1
2
, 0, 0, 1
2
1.0
Table 1: Examples of truncated IP addresses (8 bits)
with conditional entropy.
be the correct original address of an anonymized address r.
Using the distribution P (S|r) we now define the conditional
entropy on S:
H(S|r) := −
X
s∈S
P (s|r) · log2
`
P (s|r)
´
(1)
This expression measures the risk at the level of a a single
address r. It represents the average number of binary ques-
tions that have to be asked to correctly identify the correct s
given r. Large entropy indicates a bigger uncertainty about
the original address whereas low entropy corresponds to an
almost deterministic mapping. Table 1 gives an example
with 8 bits truncation. For each original address si in the
first column, column 2 holds the anonymized address ri. In
the third column, P (S|r) is shown. Consider for instance,
the first anonymized address 129.132.80.0. That is, we now
need to calculate P (si|r = 129.132.80.0) for each si in the
first column. As there are 3 possible addresses with the pre-
fix 129.132.80.*, the probability for each of these is 1/3 and
0 for all addresses with a different prefix. This results in
P (S|r = 129.132.80.0) = {
1
3
,
1
3
, 0, 0,
1
3
, 0}.
From this distribution, the conditional entropy is calcu-
lated in the last column. Note that with address number 4,
the mapping to the original address is deterministic and the
corresponding entropy is 0.0:
P (S|r = 152.88.3.0) = {0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0}.
From this local risk measure we derive a global measure:
the average probability of correctly guessing the real identity
of anonymized addresses (pcg). Note that there are various
ways of defining global risk. Please refer to [1] for a dis-
cussion. For a specific r ∈ R, pcg(r) equals to 1/2
H(S|r)
because 2H(S|r) is the number of choices for r. Accordingly,
the global pcg that averages over all r resolves to
pcg(S,R) :=
1
|R|
X
r∈R
1
2H(S|r)
. (2)
6.1 Risk for Truncation
Based on the definition of pcg we now derive a risk metric
for truncation of x bits. With truncation of x bits, addresses
represent /(32-x) networks. All addresses belonging to the
same /(32-x) network are indistinguishable in the truncated
trace. If all addresses are active (i.e. present in the traces),
this leads to a P (S|r) that has probability 0 for all s that do
not belong to the same /(32-x) network as r and probability
1/2x for the 2x values of s that belong to r’s network.
However, it is usually not the case that all hosts are active
in a network. We assume that our attacker knows S and
thus is able to restrict guesses to active hosts. We account
for this reduction of host number by introducing a constant
A (A = [0, 1]) that is specific to a network and denotes the
fraction of active hosts compared to the assigned address
space. The effect of A is that the number of eligible guesses
is reduced from 2x to 2xA. We end up with a P (S|r) that has
2xA non-zero probabilities each with value 1
2xA
. Applying
this to (1) leads to
Hx(S|r) = −2
xA
` 1
2xA
log2(
1
2xA
)
´
(3)
= −
`
log2(2
−x) + log2(A
−1)
´
(4)
= x+ log2(A). (5)
This result is consistent with intuition. As we truncate x
bits from IP addresses, the number of binary questions to ask
for recovering the information is exactly x. Restricting the
set to a fraction A of possibilities reduces the uncertainty by
− log2(A). Note that log2(A) is always negative as A <= 1.
Using (5) in (2), the final risk pcg amounts to
pcg(x) =

1
2xA
if 2xA >= 1
1 else
(6)
The term 2xA, denoting the average number of choices
for a given address, could actually be smaller than 1 due
to a scarce network (e.g. no truncation is applied and A =
0.1). However, we always have at least one potential original
address for each anonymized address. Therefore, pcg is set to
1 for 2xA < 1. That is, one can not be more than absolutely
sure about a mapping.
Note that additional permutation of truncated prefixes
in R does not improve worst case privacy of hosts. The
goal of metric pcg is to capture statistical distinguishability
by means of host characteristics and behavior. As stated
in Section 2, permutations are reversible using fingerprint
attacks. Thus, in the worst case, an attacker could first
reverse the permutation but would then again be confronted
with the indistinguishability of hosts.
It is important to note that external sources of infor-
mation could help to further distinguish between hosts.
Consider, for example, an attacker that knows the distri-
bution of S in Table 1. That is, he might know that
129.132.115.90 has ten times more traffic than 129.132.115.5.
Thus, H(S|129.132.115.0) would not be 1.0 as in the exam-
ple, but be reduced to 0.44. The above analysis assumes
that no external knowledge is given and that P (S|r) is uni-
formly distributed among hosts with the same prefix, leading
to maximum entropy. Therefore it provides a lower bound
estimation of risk. Additional external information affects
our analysis by skewing the distribution P (S|r) for blocks of
IP addresses, reducing H(S|r) and, in turn, raising the risk
pcg.
6.2 Risk Asymmetry
As we have already discussed in Section 4, internal and
external prefixes exhibit different behavior when truncation
is applied (see Fig 2). Furthermore, the above risk defini-
tion gives rise to another noteworthy asymmetry between
internal and external address space.
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Figure 5: Semi-log plot of internal and external host
identification risk pcg(x).
For SWITCH-internal addresses, A is 10.5% during the
hour shown in Fig. 2. From the 2.2 million IP addresses as-
signed to SWITCH, about 230, 000 are active. For external
addresses, A is only about 0.08% (3.4 million visible versus
232 = 4.3 · 109 potential addresses). Consequently, external
addresses are about 130 times more likely to be correctly de-
anonymized than internal addresses, simply because internal
addresses are more densely packed and unique identification
is harder. To compensate this asymmmetry, one must trun-
cate roughly 7 bits more from external addresses than from
internal addresses. Truncation of 7 additional bits leads to
a risk reduction by a factor of 27 = 128. Figure 5 plots the
internal and the external risk versus the truncated bits x.
Risk falls below 1 after 3 truncated bits for internal and 10
bits for external addresses. Beyond that point both risks
decay exponentially with a constant gap of 7 bits.
Although the 7 bits are specific to the SWITCH network,
a similar effect always occurs when traffic is measured at the
borders of a network and a distinction between internal and
external address space is made. The fraction of active inter-
nal hosts tends to be higher because all traffic from internal
hosts passes through the borders while only an insignificant
portion of the whole internet traffic is seen. In general, the
difference in truncated bits for equal risk is log2(Ain/Aout).
It is interesting to ask whether it actually makes sense to
protect external addresses in the same way as internal ad-
dresses. Whereas our results indicate that external addresses
should be anonymized stronger, Pang et al. [17] explicitly
apply the weaker prefix-preserving permutation to external
and the stronger partial prefix-preserving permutation to
internal addresses. They argue that external addresses are
more difficult to attack due to their non-locality. However,
with truncation, it is exactly this non-locality that makes ex-
ternal addresses stand out within their networks and makes
them uniquely identifiable.
It is comprehensible that data publishers are more con-
cerned with privacy of their own network and customers.
Anyway, data protection laws do not distinguish between
internal or external addresses. In particular, in Switzer-
land and in the European Union any data that can be used
either directly or indirectly, i.e., through the use of addi-
tional information, to identify an individual is considered
“personal data”and must therefore be protected. In Switzer-
land, where our data has been collected, “personal data” in-
clude data that can be used to identify a legal person, i.e.,
a company.
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Figure 6: R-U map that illustrates the risk-utility
tradeoff for IP address truncation. Markers indicate
truncated bits: diamond (no truncation), square (4),
plus (8), circle (12), star (16).
Metric x Utility Risk
internal entropy 8 0.94 0.035
internal entropy 12 0.87 0.002
external entropy 16 0.97 0.020
Table 2: Anonymized metrics with the best risk-
utility tradeoff (x: truncated bits).
In the future, we expect more and more network traces to
be published, which is the goal of anonymization research in
the first place. Of course, our internal addresses are external
addresses in all other data sets. Consequently, if external
addresses were anonymized weakly, they could be correlated
over different data sets. That would leave people incapable
of protecting their own addresses.
7. THE RISK-UTILITY TRADEOFF
In this Section we summarize the results from Sections 5
and 6 using the R-U map [7]. The R-U map is a parametric
plot with a running parameter, having x-coordinates (Util-
ity) and y-coordinates (Risk) determined by a function of
the parameter. In our case, the parameter is the number of
truncated bits x, taking the values 0-16 in steps of 4. De-
pending on x, the risk is quantified by Eq. 6 in Section 6 and
the utility is quantified by the AUC values shown in Fig. 4.
In Fig. 6, we plot the utility vs. risk for internal and exter-
nal count and entropy metrics for different truncation rates
(identified by markers). The utility on the x-axis ranges
from 0.5 to 1, where 0.5 corresponds to a low detection rate
and 1 to a high detection rate. The risk ranges from 1 to
0, where 1 is related to a very high risk and 0 to a low risk.
Consequently, the sweet spot on this map is the lower right
corner with a high utility and low risk.
To our surprise, there are three risk-utility combinations
within this area of interest, two for internal entropy and one
for external entropy. Table 2 summarizes these metrics with
the best risk-utility tradeoff.
For external entropy, truncation of 12 bits also has a very
high utility, but the associated risk of more than 0.3 is un-
acceptable. As expected, both internal and external counts
are far off the sweet spot. For counts, as soon as risk drops,
utility goes down as well.
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented a quantitative assessment
of the risk-utility tradeoff involved in IP address truncation.
We evaluated the utility of anonymized data by performing
anomaly detection on original and anonymized data. The
risk of host identification in anonymized data was formally
estimated using a metric based on conditional entropy. The
results were summarized in a comprehensive Risk-Utility
map.
We found that entropy metrics are far more resistant to
truncation than unique count metrics. Moreover, there is a
fundamental asymmetry between internal and external ad-
dress distributions for stub networks. Both risk and utility
decay faster for internal addresses with increasing number
of truncated bits. Consequently, the least useful metric is
internal address count as even truncation of only 4 bits ren-
ders it useless. On the other hand, the utility of external
address entropy is virtually untouched even for truncation
of 20 bits. With respect to the risk-utility tradeoff we identi-
fied three metrics (calculated on truncated data) with an ex-
cellent tradeoff having a remaining utility between 87% and
97% and host identification risk of only 0.2% to 3.5%. We
conclude that truncation offers a better protection against
host identification risk than permutation-based IP address
anonymization techniques. At the same time, a major part
of utility for anomaly detection can be retained using en-
tropy metrics.
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